It would be puerile to believe that the death sentence passed by Bangladesh’s International Crimes Tribunal (ICT) on Sheikh Hasina was fair. The trial was riddled with faults on various judicial counts.
Hasina was found guilty of mass murder by the ICT, which itself was set by the Hasina government in 2009 to try those accused of war crimes during the 1971 War of Liberation. A majority of the war criminals were from the Jamaat-e-Islami (JeI), the largest pro-Pakistan organisation that had collaborated with the Pakistani Army in committing genocide. Some JeI leaders were hanged, and others jailed for life after conviction.
The proceedings against Hasina were vitiated from the very beginning after Muhammad Yunus, a sworn enemy of Hasina nursing political ambitions, was foisted on Dhaka as the head of an interim government (IG). This interim arrangement is widely considered unconstitutional when parliament and the Constitution are both suspended. The JeI and other Islamist outfits, all deeply connected to Pakistan, are now the backbone of the IG and are calling the shots.
The ICT’s mandate was changed by adopting unconstitutional methods that were rubber-stamped by the partisan judiciary. The chief prosecutor in Hasina’s case is a JeI lawyer who had defended the war criminals. Hasina was not permitted to choose her defence team. All these factors have raised serious questions about the validity of the judgement.
The IG’s ire against Hasina and the Awami League (AL) is well known. They are weaponising a compromised judiciary to attack opponents while the media remains bludgeoned into submission. Judges have been forced out and new ones affiliated to JeI appointed en masse.
The IG has systematically conducted a campaign of revenge, allowing mobs to kill Awami workers and destroy their properties. Thousands have lost their lives and many have fled the country. Scores of journalists and civil society activists have been jailed with false murder charges and been denied bail. Minority communities have also been attacked all over the country, with Yunus dismissing it as ‘political violence’ or Indian propaganda. Such violence has caused trans-border tremors in India.
Hasina’s opponents, from Yunus downwards, are elated at the verdict and hail that she has been held accountable for her crimes. Ironically, Yunus himself dodged accountability in legal cases in which he was accused of tax evasion and money laundering by promptly annulling these cases when he took over as head of the IG.
The recent visit by Bangladesh’s National Security Advisor for a multilateral meeting in Delhi came on the heels of the Hasina verdict. It is likely that the demand for handing over Hasina would have been made. Will India comply and allow Hasina to be taken to the gallows? It seems very far-fetched that India will comply after an unfair trial with a pre-arranged verdict. The bilateral extradition treaty between the neighbouring countries explicitly exempts extradition for ‘an offence of a political character’ (Article 6).
In truth, Bangladesh was the victim of a regime-change operation. Such operations are conducted by hegemonic powers to pursue their geopolitical interests. When the leader of a country refuses to accept certain demands, they are overthrown by the traditional gunboat diplomacy and direct operations by intelligence agencies that attempt to oust the incumbent leader, as we are witnessing against Venezuela.
The other option is the more subtle one—influence operations via non-governmental organisations and/or social media platforms to exploit an agitation on domestic issues. Bangladesh was a victim of this kind of operation. American NGOs like the National Democratic Institute and the International Republican Institute are well known for such activities under the radar of ‘promoting democracy’ and ‘human rights’. They are known to work in tandem with the American deep state. On a visit to the US, Yunus acknowledged that the regime change was “meticulously” planned.
Hasina’s death sentence portends further political volatility in Bangladesh unless the IG moves quickly to conduct a free, fair, and inclusive election. Continued doubts about the elections scheduled in February 2026 are testing public patience. The current ban on the Awai League is another factor in rising uncertainty about the political process. The League is Bangladesh’s largest grassroots party and cannot be wished away. Hasina may not be able to participate in elections, but her party should be allowed, to ensure inclusivity and fair representation.
The Hasina factor will remain an irritant in bilateral ties. The unpredictability of Bangladesh’s future trajectory is an overhang that will define India’s strategic options. India is currently exercising strategic patience. Trade, energy and supply of essential commodities continue unhindered.
India will endeavour to restore the status quo in bilateral ties leaving the Hasina episode aside. This effort will be facilitated if an elected government is in place in Dhaka through a free, fair and inclusive election next year. How to deal with political flux, rise of radical religious and anti-India groups in the political space, who seek to reorient Bangladesh ideologically, will pose a strategic dilemma.
Bangladesh’s geography constricts the Siliguri Corridor or ‘Chicken’s Neck’, which connects the northeastern states of India to the rest of the country. Hence, this remains a strategic concern if Bangladesh provides opportunities to powers hostile to India. For instance, if Bangladesh provides military facilities to China along the Bay of Bengal, it will pose a dilemma and trigger options to counter these moves.
Periodic challenges to India’s Neighbourhood First policy are bound to arise owing to domestic political upheavals and security threats that may spill over into India. The IG in Dhaka has increasingly aligned with Islamabad. This will be watched closely because of the potential of Pakistan organising terrorist attacks from Bangladesh. Frequent visits by Pakistani generals, and by representatives of internationally designated terrorist organisations Lashkar-e-Taiba and Jaish-e-Muhammad, have been reported.
These aspects will be under India’s scanner. Any security threat from Bangladesh’s soil will invite Indian retaliation. Bangladesh should be conscious of not overplaying the Pakistan card. The recent bomb blasts in Delhi have thrown up links with Pakistan and with Bangladesh, too. India has, so far, exercised considerable restraint.
Pinak Ranjan Chakravarty | Former Secretary, Ministry of External Affairs, and former High Commissioner to Bangladesh
(Views are personal)
