The narrative surrounding the recent Bihar assembly election has been constructed in several overlapping ways. It has been interpreted as an expression of gratitude to, and trust in, a leader who is perceived to deliver on promises; as evidence of women emerging as anchors of voting decisions in poor households; and as a demonstration of how a tone of masculine arrogance can weaken emotional connect with voters. Across these different readings lies one clear lesson for the political class: admiration does not automatically translate into endorsement, especially among an electorate as politically attuned as Bihar’s.
The verdict itself has left little ambiguity. The NDA increased its tally dramatically, from 125 seats in 2020 to an emphatic 202. By contrast, the Mahagathbandhan suffered its worst performance since 2010, finishing with just 35 seats. These headline numbers are striking enough, but the real clarity emerges when the mandate is broken down regionally. A closer look at the five principal regions of Bihar shows how differently each area responded to the two competing alliances, rewarding some strategies while punishing others. As with the rivers that mark many of their boundaries, each region flowed in a particular direction.
Take Tirhut first. Bordered by the Ganga and Gandak rivers and accounting for 73 seats, it forms the largest bloc in north Bihar. Tirhut was widely expected to witness a tight contest. This expectation stemmed from the substantial presence of one of the key Extremely Backward Classes (EBCs)—the Mallah community—whose leader, Mukesh Sahani, had crossed over to the MGB. As the VIP defector, he was projected as a deputy chief ministerial face of the MGB and expected to draw the fishers’ community towards the alliance. His arrival was also seen as a direct challenge to Nitish Kumar’s sustained cultivation of the EBC bloc since 2005.
Yet, the results in Tirhut mirrored the broader state mandate. The NDA’s tally jumped by 22 seats to 64. Its vote share rose sharply, from 39 percent to 46.6 percent. Much of this increase stemmed from the consolidation of its core vote blocs, aided significantly by Chirag Paswan’s Lok Janshakti Party (Ram Vilas) rejoining the alliance. Although the MGB lost these 22 seats, its vote share, interestingly, also increased—by about 2 percentage points to 38.4 percent. This suggests that while the alliance did benefit from some Mallah EBC votes, the combined return of Chirag Paswan and Upendra Kushwaha’s Rashtriya Lok Morcha shored up both Dalit Paswan and Kushwaha votes behind the NDA.
A similar story unfolded in the Mithila region west of the Koshi river. This region has a significant presence of Muslims, Yadavs, and Mallahs, leading many analysts to expect an uptick in MGB’s performance. Sahani’s roots in the region added weight to that expectation. Yet, the NDA increased its tally from 32 to 36 seats. Its vote share rose by about 6 percentage points, reaching 47.4 percent. The outcome reflected a noticeable improvement in the NDA’s internal coordination, which enabled smoother transfer of votes across allies and ensured that each party’s core bloc remained intact. This was an important correction for the NDA, given that some of these blocs had shown signs of drifting in the 2020 election.
The Seemanchal region, which borders Bengal and includes the Bhagalpur area, told a more nuanced story. With its sizeable Muslim population, ranging from around 68 percent in Kishanganj to roughly 40 percent in the three adjoining districts, Seemanchal was widely expected to consolidate behind the MGB. It was presumed to occur partly at the cost of the Asaduddin Owaisi-led All India Majlis-e-Ittehadul Muslimeen, which had won five seats with 7.4 percent of the vote in 2020.
However, AIMIM retained its five seats and increased its vote share to 9.9 percent. This shift indicates that although Muslim consolidation against the ruling alliance did occur in places, the pattern was far from uniform. Muslim-majority constituencies displayed a willingness to experiment with alternatives.
The most striking shift occurred in the Magadh-South East and Shahabad-Bhojpur regions. These areas still retain pockets of Left influence and are home to several OBC and EBC caste groups. In 2020, the Left’s organisational networks had significantly boosted the MGB, helping it secure 39 out of 69 seats in Magadh and 19 out of 22 seats in Bhojpur. The NDA, by contrast, had managed only 28 seats in Magadh and just two in the Bhojpur belt.
In 2025, this picture changed dramatically. The NDA surged to 57 seats in Magadh and 19 in the Bhojpur region, supported by a substantial rise in vote share—13 percent in the former and 16 percent in the latter. For the MGB, this reversal stemmed from several factors. The RJD struggled to expand beyond its core Muslim-Yadav support in certain pockets, the Left parties saw their earlier momentum dissipate, and the Congress remained organisationally weak. Meanwhile, the NDA benefited from careful ticket distribution, the resolution of internal rivalries, and more efficient vote transfers among allies. Except for a few localised disruptions, this cohesion translated into a near-clean sweep.
Taken together, the regional verdicts underscore a larger point. The 2025 Bihar election was shaped less by arithmetic and more by the ability of alliances to hold their blocs together while expanding into new social groups. The NDA managed this consistently, while the MGB faltered in the areas it needed to grow. That is what ultimately tipped the scales.
Sajjan Kumar | Political analyst and founding director of PRACCIS
(Views are personal)
