The war in Gaza has dragged on for months with no sign of closure. Israel’s military machine has inflicted massive destruction on the densely-packed strip, killing thousands of Palestinians. But the elusive goal of ‘final victory’ remains beyond reach. Daily reports of two dozen or more casualties are less a measure of military progress than a commentary on Israel’s inability to impose its terms. Simultaneously, the diplomatic ground is shifting in ways that may prove more consequential than battlefield maps—and India, as always, must read both carefully.
Gaza is a narrow coastal enclave of just 365 sq km, home to some 2.1 million people. Israel has committed tens of thousands of troops in a campaign of relentless airstrikes and grinding urban combat. Despite repeated announcements of control over neighbourhoods in Gaza City and other towns, Hamas remains far from annihilated. The urban layout and embedded militias make conventional dominance difficult.
What emerges is a paradox. Israel wields overwhelming firepower, yet cannot translate it into decisive political outcomes. Hostages taken during the October attacks constrain operational freedom. International outrage remains high. Domestic fatigue over prolonged deployments and casualties erode confidence. The result is a war of attrition where Israel can destroy but not fully conquer. Victory in war is rarely black-and-white.
While Gaza’s streets lie in ruins, the mood in diplomatic corridors has shifted distinctly. In New York, Benjamin Netanyahu’s speech to the UN General Assembly was defiant, rejecting recognitions for a Palestinian state by European and Australian governments. He dismissed them as “rewards” for terror. Yet his speech drew walkouts and protests, symbolic of Israel’s growing isolation.
The recognitions are historic. France, the UK, Belgium, Portugal, Luxembourg, Australia and others have joined over 155 UN members who now formally acknowledge Palestine. Recognition does not alter borders or lift Gaza’s blockade, but it changes the diplomatic balance. The Palestinian Authority under Mahmoud Abbas gains fresh legitimacy just as it seeks to reposition itself as the alternative to Hamas. Addressing the UNGA virtually, Abbas called for a ceasefire and signalled the PA’s readiness to assume responsibility for Gaza if Hamas is excluded. The momentum is scripting its own narrative, with a significant diplomatic push for the two-state solution.
The US stands uneasily against this tide. It has shielded Israel repeatedly in the Security Council, vetoing harsher resolutions. But it faces domestic disquiet—Arab-American communities, progressive Democrats, and a restless younger generation are critical of Israel’s conduct. The European and Australian recognitions have widened the Atlantic gap. America’s line that “now is not the time” for statehood looks increasingly lonely.
For India, the challenge lies in balancing history with present realities. New Delhi was among the earliest non-Arab states to recognise Palestine, doing so in 1988, and it continues to affirm support for a two-state solution. At the same time, India’s ties with Israel have grown into a strategic partnership, underpinned by critical defence cooperation, intelligence sharing, and technology transfers that directly strengthen its security.
The US remains a central partner in India’s Indo-Pacific calculus. Current shifts in India-US relations should be read as tactical adjustments rather than a strategic rupture; but the India-US equation in West Asia must not be viewed through a tactical prism alone. In this triangle of relationships, India must tread carefully—upholding its principled backing for Palestinian statehood, preserving the invaluable security relationship with Israel, and keeping step with a US whose influence still shapes the wider region.
Another undercurrent is visible in West Asia itself. Saudi Arabia, once close to normalising ties with Israel under US sponsorship, has recoiled in the face of Gaza’s devastation. Riyadh has instead inched towards a defence arrangement with Pakistan. While not quite a Nato-style guarantee, reports suggest discussions on structured security cooperation, even an “Article 5-like” assurance. For Riyadh, this hedging diversifies security partnerships beyond Washington. For Islamabad, it is a chance to recover relevance in the Arab world by aligning visibly with the Palestinian cause.
For India, these developments carry two implications. First, Pakistan’s standing in West Asia, dented in recent years, may rise again—complicating India’s own Gulf partnerships. Second, Saudi discomfort with Washington’s Israel tilt may eventually push Riyadh towards new alignments, where India will need to position itself with dexterity to safeguard its energy and diaspora interests.
Israel’s military strength is unquestioned, but its inability to end the war on its terms exposes the limits of force in urban, asymmetrical conflict. The more rubble Gaza accumulates, the less the world sees Israeli “victory”, and the more it rallies to Palestine’s diplomatic cause.
India has historic ties with Palestine and flourishing bonds with Israel. New Delhi has consistently called for an immediate ceasefire, condemned terrorism, and affirmed support for a two-state solution. That balance should continue. But India must also prepare for a future where Palestine’s diplomatic legitimacy hardens further, Israel remains militarily entangled, and the US struggles to contain trans-Atlantic divergence.
The Gulf, home to millions of Indian workers and vital energy arteries, is itself in flux. Saudi hedging is one symptom, Emirati caution another, and Iranian activism a third. A West Asia fragmented by new alignments will demand nuanced Indian diplomacy—principled enough to stand by Palestinian rights, pragmatic enough to preserve strategic partnerships with Israel and the US, and nimble enough to adjust as the diplomatic map redraws itself.
The war in Gaza shows that sheer military destruction is not victory. The battlefield has produced rubble, not resolution. Diplomacy—from recognitions in Europe and Australia to recalibrations in Riyadh—is steadily reshaping the region’s political landscape. Votes at the UN are once again acquiring strategic weight, amid quiet recalculations. India’s West Asia approach has been one of its foreign policy highmarks, demanding the same commitment and continuity. We must look well beyond Gaza’s rubble and read the diplomatic map being drawn across it.
Lt Gen Syed Ata Hasnain (retd) | Former Commander, Srinagar-based 15 Corps; Chancellor, Central University of Kashmir
(Views are personal)
(atahasnain@gmail.com)
